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Abstract. The fast evolution of Botnet malware made it extremely dif-
ficult to detect. Despite it can be just considered as a tool, nowadays it
has become one of the most dangerous threats for system administrators.
Botnets are used as the starting point for different kind of attacks, such
as SPAM, Denegation of Service, key logging and traffic sniffing, among
others. In this paper we analyze some of the most relevant network traffic
characteristics used for Botnet recognition. We have reviewed the most
important works in the field of Botnet detection and have carried out an
analysis in order to establish which are more appropriate to describe the
Botnet behavior. Our final goal is to provide to network administrators
the bases for building tools that can help them in their daily fight against
this security threat.
1 Introduction
Malware is a kind of software that damage computers and compromise the in-
formation inside them. The problem increases due to the accelerate development
in the informatics field. With the important growth of malware along with the
progress made in Artificial intelligence (AI) have resulted in the arising of Bot-
nets.
A Botnet can be defined as net of bots, that is malware software installed
on compromised computer with the ability of automatically propagating itself
to new computers hosts. All the infected computers conform a Net of Bots
with synchronized behavior. Botnet operation can be remotely controlled by a
Botmaster to perform different malicious activities. Since a Botnet can be view
as nothing more than a tool, there are several potential criminal uses for them.
Botnets have the capacity of continuously changing their behavior. This
evolving capacity made them more difficult to detect. However, it is possible to
recognize their presence in the network. For detecting Botnet activity on local
networks it is important to know how Botnets work and which are the common
characteristics of these nets. By studying Botnet behavior, we might be able to
detect and mitigate their effects.
In this work we intend to analyze different network traffic features capable of
recognizing the presence of Botnets. We analyze the most relevant Botnet detec-
tion methods [4,6,5,11,1] in order to find out the relation between the network
traffic features they use and their relation with Botnets behavior. The goal is to
establish which are the attributes with the higher discriminate power. Network
administrators may follow the behavior of features in the network, by using tools
such as MRTG [8] or RRDTOOL [10]. Eventually, they can find some anomalies
in the traffic, and it might indicate that there is an attack, or a bot in the local
network. The contribution of our work is to analyze certain attributes, in order
to describe the relation between them and Botnets behavior. In that sense, it
will be helpful to identify anomalies in traffic that leads us to detect Botnets
and possible network attacks.
This work is organized as follows: in section 2, we present a background, it
defines Botnets and gives a short explanation of how do they work. Then, we
introduce the Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), follow by the concept of net-
work traffic feature and their classification. In section 4, we present the Botnets
detection features, according to the given classification. Finally, in section 5, we
present a conclusion.
2 Background
2.1 Botnets
As the word suggests, Botnet, is a net composed of bots. The word bot comes
from RoBot, bots are smart programs that can be automatically executed and
can perform different actions according to the orders given by someone remote
controlling them [3]. No human intervention is required by the bots to perform
their tasks. These nets composed of bots, have the purpose of attacking and tak-
ing new hosts in order to conform the botnet. Making this process automatically,
the botnet grows. Thus, a botnet, also known as zombie army, is a net of bots.
A Botnetmaster is the person who control Botnets trough remote control.
They use their zombie army with different purposes, for example Distributed
Denegation of Service (DDoS) attacks or spamming among others.
Furthermore, botnetmasters manage their Botnets using different control
mechanisms. Those mechanisms include the protocols and the commands used
by them to control his Botnet. There are two kinds of network architectures: cen-
tralized and decentralized ones. As shown in Fig. 1 (a), centralized nets usually
have a central server where the bots are connected to. Decentralize Botnets have
a server as well, but they differ in that they use peer-to-peer communication
(P2P), this is shown in Fig. 1(b).
Moreover, there are different kinds of servers, the ones who use the IRC
protocol, Fig. 2(a) and the others: web servers, that use the HTTP protocol Fig.
2(b).
2.2 Intrusion Detection
An NIDS (Network Intrusion Detection System) is a software that detects unau-
thorized access to a network by sniffers and analyzing the network traffic. The
(a) Centralized Botnet (b) Decentralized Botnet
Fig. 1: Botnet Topologies
(a) IRC Protocol (b) HTTP Protocol
Fig. 2: Botnet underlying protocols
goal of this kind of systems is to detect intrusions in a network. Hence, a NIDS
analyses the activity of a certain network, looking for possible intrusions and
threats.
There are two main intrusion detection methods: anomaly-based and misuse-
based [2]. The first method defines a model of normal traffic and compares it
with the network traffic to be analyzed. If there are any differences with the
normal traffic, it is considered an anomaly and it might be a threat or a possible
attack. The normal traffic model is built by following certain parameters, for
example, the number of connections, packet distribution according to protocol,
etc. In opposition, the second method defines a model of intrusions, and waits for
them to occur. These methods use different techniques. For example, anomaly-
based may use statistics, machine learning or data mining. On the other hand,
misuse-based methods usually use pattern recognition, implication rules or data
mining [2].
2.3 Features
The term attributes or features is usually related to data mining or machine
learning process [12]. However, for the purpose of our study, features are defined
as certain characteristics of a set of data that can be obtained from network traffic
captures. The analysis of network traffic features are the bases for network-based
IDS.
There are two attributes classifications, one related to the computational
resources needed to be obtained and the other one to the network traffic source
[2]. In the first classification, there are two cases: low-level features that can
be acquired from raw traffic captures (as IP headers, or protocol) and high-level
features that are the results of the traffic capture processing. For instance: Bytes
per packet, packets per second, etc. These features might be obtained from low-
level attributes.
The second classification mentioned, has three possibilities: packet, flow and
payload features. These are obtained from packet headers, the information of net-
work connections and packet payload (application layer) respectively. To clarify
this classification, we present a diagram in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3: Attributes classification
3 Network traffic features used in Botnet detection
In this section we present the features for Botnet detection, as suggested by the
most relevant authors in the Botnet detection field [4,5,6,11,1] All these authors
also implement different algorithms in order to detect Botnets. However, our
analysis is only focused on Botnets features. We will describe those attributes
following the classification related to the network traffic source (packet, flow,
payload). It should be noted that some features are included in more than one
category, for instance an attribute might be packet and flow based.
3.1 Packet based features
Some of the features for Botnet detection are included in this category. In par-
ticular, a number of authors such as Gu [4], Karasaridis [5], Strayer [11] and
Livadas [6] have worked with the Bytes-per-packet (Bpp) feature, and Strayer
[11] mentioned that Bpp is the attribute that present the most discriminatory
power. Moreover, Gu [4] utilized the features: average number of bytes per pack-
ets (Bpp) and number of packets-per-flow (ppf). This last one, can be considered
a flow feature as well, because it takes into account the information of the flow.
Binkley [1] proposed the metric TCP work weight, which is obtained by using
the following formula: w = (Ss+Fs+Rr)/Tsr, where Ss are the SYN's plus SYN-
ACKs sent, Fs the FIN's sent, Rs the RESETS and Tsr are the total number of
TCP packets. This information is obtained from the TCP packets. The value of
this metrics is expressed as a percentage. If this value is closer to 100% (percent),
there are more possibilities for some kind of anomaly to occur. Another packet
feature considered by [1] is IP source. This information is obtained from the
packet header. Thus, it is consider a low-level attribute.
Furthermore, Karasadiris [5] considers the feature packets-per-flow (ppf),
which is also a flow feature, and bytes-per-packet (Bpp). Likewise, this last
feature is also suggested in [11].
In addition, Livadas informs that the features with most discriminatory
power are: the percentage of packets that are pushed (PctPktsPushed), and
the variance in the Bytes-per-packet (varBpp), besides Bpp.
3.2 Flow based features
The flow features suggested by Gu [4] are: the number of packets per flow (ppf),
the number of flows per hour (fph) and the average number of bytes per second
(bps). Karasadiris [5] besides using packets-per-flow (ppf) also uses flows-per-
address (fpa). This feature is obtained making an association between a local
IP address and their local port with several remote IP addresses and remote
ports. Then, [11] expresses that the features with high discriminatory values
are: duration, role (it means, who started the flow: the client or the server),
average bits per second (bps), and average packets per second (pps).
3.3 Payload based features
Binkley [1], selected several payload features using two lists: Channel Name (is
the name of the IRC channel), Joins (to the channel), Private Messages, Hits
(the joins plus the private messages), number of IPs in the channel and the list
of the IP numbers. All those features are related to a channel, that is why they
are called Channel List. The other list is the Node List related to the metrics
obtained from any IP address in any IRC channel. The flow features in this list
are: Total Messages, Joins, Pings, Pongs, Private Messages, Channels and Server
Hits (the number of messages sent to/from a host).
3.4 Analysis
In Table 1, we summarize the information discussed in previous sections. The
table shows information regarding the authors, the features utilized by them,
the kind of attributes, and the detection method selected by each.
Table 1: Botnet Detection Feature analysis
Author Features Type of feature Detection
technique
Guofrei Gu
[4]
number of flows per hour
(fph)
high level, flow
number of packets per flow
(ppf)
high level, flow, packet Anomaly-based
and misuse-based
average number of bytes
per packets (bpp)
high level, packet
average number of bytes
per second (bps)
high level, flow
flows-per-address (fpa) high level, flow
Karasaridis
[5]
packets-per-flow (ppf) high level, flow, packet Anomaly-based
bytes-per-packet (bpp) high level, packet
duration high level, flow
Strayer [11],
Livadas[6]
role high level, flow
average bytes per packet
(Bpp)
high level, packet Misused-based
average bits per second
(bps)
high level, flow
average packets per second
(pps)
high level, packet
% of packets that are
pushed (PctPktsPushed)
high level, packet
variance in the
Bytes-per-packet (varBpp)
high level, packet
TCP work weight high level, packet
Binkley[1] Chanel Name
(CHANNAME)
high level, payload
joins high level, payload Anomaly-based
hits high level, payload
private messages
(PRIVMSGS)
high level, payload
number of IPs in the
channel (NOIPS)
high level, payload
list of the IPs (IP_LIST) high level, payload
IP source (IPSCR) low level, packet
total messages
(TOTALMSG)
high level, payload
pings high level,payload
pongs high level ,payload
private messages
(PRIVMSGS)
high level, payload
channels high level, payload
server hits high level, payload
In order to understand the features presented by each author, it is important
to know how do Botnets works. For example, we can say that Botnet behavior
is synchronized [4,5]. In that sense, we present the features and analyze their
relation with Botnet operation.
The feature Bpp, is selected for several authors for Botnet detection [4,6,5,11].
In the case of Botnets, the value of Bpp is low because the messages between
the bots and the Botnetmaster are short commands. So, the size of the packets
are approximately 1KB [7]. Furthermore, the duration of this communication is
short, so it is another feature to be considered.
Moreover, the number of flows per hour (fph) suggested by Gu et al. [4] has
a relation with Botnet behavior too. When the Botnetmaster send commands
to their bots, he do it at the same time, so suddenly a lot of flows may appear.
And the number of flows-per-address (fpa) will be high as well.
In the case of Botnets, the attribute packets-per-flow (ppf), does not reach a
high value because there are a few packets that the botmaster sends to the bots
with instructions. Bytes-per-second reaches a low number too as the messages
sent are short. Regarding the role feature, considered by Strayer [11], the impor-
tance is on who initiates the communication, which is usually the server (in this
case, the Botnetmaster).
Blinkley's [1] analysis focuses on finding IRC-based Botnets, by using two list:
the channel list and the node list. The first one, is composed by the following fea-
tures: {CHANNAME, HITS, JOINS, PRIVMSGS, NOIPS, IP_LIST}, which
have already been described. The node list, mentioned in subsection 3.3, contains
the features: {IPSCR, TOTALMSG, JOINS, PINGS, PONGS, PRIVMSGS,
SERVERHITS}. To identify Botnets, the author proposed to find certain values
or characteristics in these features. One of them, is to identify the evil channels
that must be the ones with a lot of hosts with a high value of TCP work weight.
This attribute, TCP Work Weight, is an indicator of a possible scanning or the
presence of a worm.
As we have seen, the features selected have a relation with Botnet behav-
ior. However, our goal is to find the most useful features for Botnet detection.
These ones are not related to a particular kind of Botnet. For instance: IRC
based, HTTP-based, centralized, etc. In that sense, the features selected by [1]
would not be the best ones, because it intent to detect only IRC-based Botnets.
Therefore, an important feature to consider is Bpp, because the communication
between the bots and the Botnet master always include short messages, while
data transfer packets in normal traffic are longer. Another attribute to highlight
is the number of flows per hour (fph), as we have indicate, this feature have also
a relation with Botnets operation. In general the messages are sent to all the
bots simultaneously. Since Botnets are larger, commands are given to the entire
net, and not to individuals bots [11]. Since communication between the Botnet-
master and their bots have a small interval of time, we consider that duration is
another helpful attribute to detect Botnets as well.
4 Concluding remarks and future work
Today, Botnets are one of the most important threats in network security. They
are originated by the combination of malware and IA. Since they are constantly
evolving, it is really difficult to detect and mitigate them. In that sense, it is
crucial to understand the behavior of Botnets, in order to find the network
traffic features that can potentially help system administrators to detect them.
Due to Botnets behavior changes, it is difficult to detect them, however in
the past years, several complex Botnet detection methods have been proposed.
These methods were based on machine learning, pattern recognition and cluster-
ing among others. Still, we believe a much simpler approach is possible. Given
some traffic network features with high discrimination power, it is possible to
utilize certain network analyzer tools as MRTG[8] or RRDTools [10] in order to
help system administrator in the Botnet detection process. Moreover, it is also
possible to use such features for writing a proper signature rules for using with
a NIDS such as Snort [9]. Notice that we are aware this approach will be not
enough for fully Botnets detection, but we think it can potentially provide good
enough information for helping system administrators in their daily fight against
intruders.
Therefore, regardless of the detection method utilized by the different au-
thors, our goal with this work was to understand how the attributes are related
with Botnet behavior. We analyzed network traffic attributes under two major
aspects. First, from the point of view of computational resources requirements.
Second, how the attributes are related with Botnet behavior
From our analysis came out that, since the most interesting attributes are
the ones related to Botnets behavior. On the other hand, attributes such as the
protocol used, or the connection ports are useless. Moreover, we consider that,
the attributes with most discriminatory power can be, in the first place Bpp,
because the kind of messages send by the bots and the Botnetmaster are partic-
ularly short. In second place we consider flows per hour (fph) as another network
traffic feature with high potential for Botnet detection. Finally, connection du-
ration, is also an important network traffic characteristic for recognizing Botnet
behavior. These network traffic features provide a good trade off between their
discriminative power and the computational resources they need. Therefore, we
believe system administrators can exploit the benefits of these network traffic
features in his daily battle against Botnet propagation.
In a future work, we intent to evaluate the performance of the features se-
lected in this survey in order to find the optimal performance in Botnet detection.
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